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Abstract

Examining the effect of Iraq, Iran and other countries of Persian Gulf, as well as the external factors, on the mechanism of controlling power and maintaining stability during 1970s is an important issue in the history of the Persian Gulf. Iraq's occupation of Kuwait (August 8, 1990) was the last strike to the control mechanism in the strategic region of Persian Gulf, a mechanism that had been seriously damaged by the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. During eight years of the Iran-Iraq war, the ineffectiveness of this mechanism was proven. However, the definitive death of this mechanism occurred when Iraq was uprising against the existing semi-armed state and tried to redefine its position by changing the structure and dividing the power of the regional system. At that time, the Islamic Republic of Iran, neither could nor wanted to play the role of a control mechanism in the regional system. On the one hand, the six Arab states of the region, which formed the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council and created the rapid reaction force and also a common defense shield, were attempting to deploy an internal control mechanism without requiring the two powers of the region, namely Iran and Iraq, while practically, it was revealed that without the support of transnational intervener players, they were unable to survive and maintain the region's system. Thus, formation of a coalition by major western powers for the liberation of Kuwait, the control mechanism that worked in shadows during the years after the 70s and only came to the scene at times of crisis and when the regional system was at risk played the role of regulating the equations and relations of the Persian Gulf region.

Keywords: Iran, Iraq, Persian Gulf, Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, United States, Balance of Power
Introduction

From a historical perspective, the discovery of large oil reserves and growing need of the industrialized world for this vital material in the early 20th century led the Gulf region to become a determining structure in the global system. Since its appearance, this system has experienced various control structures. From the beginning, the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf’s southern limit, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain, which possess the world’s largest oil reserves, were the players and peripheral components of the system form the core or central part of the Persian Gulf subsystem, as well as Iran and Iraq. However, Iraq was more closely associated with this core in terms of racial, linguistic and social variables.

By the early years of 1970s, Britain had played the role of a superior power, interventionist system and control mechanism in the Persian Gulf, which was proceeded by the United States. However, during the years of British presence in the region, tensions broke out between some members of the core and periphery, even with the influential power in the Persian Gulf subsystem, while the indisputable authority of Britain across the Middle East prevented any kind of transformation within the system. All this time, assuring the security of oil exports from the Persian Gulf to industrialized countries and preventing the emergence of a regional or trans-regional power that was a threat for the Britain in the region was the main target of the interventionist power.

The key role of the British government in cooperation with the United States in designing and implementing the coup d'état of Iran in August 19, 1953 was one of the prominent examples of the role of intervention forces in maintaining the current status of the Persian Gulf in favor of the West. After this coup, with the purpose of suppressing any anti-system moves in the region, the British government encouraged Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan governments to conclude a military pact in Baghdad in order localize the control mechanism since the new imperialism, which had begun a new phase of its life, was subject to harsh response with its direct presence and involvement in the regional structures. Nevertheless, the Baghdad Military Pact collapsed with the fall of the royal regime in Iraq and reign of the nationalists in this country and could not fulfill the British intentions.

In the early years of 1970s, profound changes occurred in the international relations and approaches of the major powers of the capitalist world, the consequences and reflections of which affected the rest of the world. New ideas in the foreign and military policies of the
superior states were formed, which were deeply rooted in a sequence of economic, military and social causes and aimed at reforming inefficient domestic and overseas policies. These policies included pacifist movements and the era of Détente, the strategy of the East of Suez of Britain and the United States Climatic partnership Theory. These changes specifically targeted the strategic region of the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, and the Iranian Empire in particular. By accepting the new political and security role, the Pahlavi government quickly became the center of focus to the West, as well as a major military power (Chamankar, 2011; 581).

Along with these changes and nationalists’ rising power, the Ba'ath Party in Iraq turned the country into an element of turbulence in the Persian Gulf subsystem, the control and containment of which was vital to the stability and security of the region, as favored by the west. Therefore, the control mechanism was designed and implemented under the name of the Nixon Doctrine or superior power of the Persian Gulf with the military authority of Iran and financial influence of Saudi Arabia in the early 70s.

By applying the new regulating mechanism, the Persian Gulf subsystem entered a new era of its existence. As the peripheral countries of the system, Iran was assigned to controlling Iraq, which was another peripheral actor, in order to guarantee the stability and security of the region and keep oil exports open and safe for the world. The mechanism moved toward the other peripheral country, namely Iraq, after the Iranian revolution in the late 70s. This time, Iraq was the inhibiting factor of the Iranian revolution and maintained the balance of power in the Persian Gulf during 1980s.

The main approach in the current research was to evaluate the efforts toward creating security systems in the region since the 70s and 80s until the early 90s. Furthermore, the study aimed to investigate the influential factors in the security of the Persian Gulf in terms of the circumstances of the day. In this regard, role of internal and external factors involved in the security and general scope of security issues in the Persian Gulf would be clarified.

**Status of Iran as a Factor in Creating Security and Stability in the Persian Gulf in 1970s**

The US government’s approach in 1970s, which aimed at preventing the spread of communism and was based on direct involvement in regional conflicts, was defeated in 1970s. This policy was employed after World War II with the purpose of filling the gap resulted from the withdrawal of European powers affected by the war from the third world regions, as well as confronting the left movements, and it turned the United States to the top world power and defender of a free world against what was called an Iron Curtain for nearly a quarter of a century.

During this time, military and naval forces of the United Stated were present in Korea, Vietnam and Dominican Republic and established military bases around the world. However, this policy failed with the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War, and the government of this country faced an international incompetency crisis. Therefore, an

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3The boundary that separated the Soviet Union and its neighbors (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia) from the rest of Europe was known as the “Iron Curtain”. This term refers to the lack of freedom for expressing ideas and traveling inside or outside the borders of these countries (Ali Babaei, 2005; 176).
alternative policy emerged in the form of the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine to form the future of Asia by Asian hands in the early 70s.

According to the new policy, the responsibility to provide security for the regions in the large areas\(^4\) of the world (Duerti, 1994; 260) was assigned to superior regional powers. Strengthening regional powers and assigning responsibility to maintain the stability and security of the regions was the main objective of the new US policy. According to the new plan, in the Persian Gulf region, the twin pillars of political-military and financial structure were formed, by which both Iran and Saudi Arabia became two dominant powers of the region. In this structure, which was known as the twin-pillar policy, the dominant military role in the Persian Gulf was assigned to Iran, while the economic role was assigned to Saudi Arabia to influence the developments of the region by using oil revenues and its scope of influence, thereby maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf subsystem to guarantee the supply of cheap oil. As such, Iran played the role of controlling mechanism or superior power in the region due to having potential features, such as long beaches in the Persian Gulf, rich resources of oil and its huge revenues and a large population (Yekta, 2004; 112).

As the superior power in the regional system, Iran managed to control and isolate Iraq, who was Iran’s worst neighbor. Also, help of the CIA\(^5\) and widespread support for the armed Barzani Kurds uprising against the Iraqi Ba'ath government severely deteriorated the country, causing heavy casualties and losses in military and economic facilities. As a result of the new conditions, Iraqi leaders saw the solution in resolving their disputes with Iran, and in 1975, following the meeting between Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Iraqi Vice President at the time and Saddam Hussein during the leaders’ summit of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)\(^6\) in Algeria, and with the mediation of Houari Boumediene, Algeria’s president at the time, the two sides agreed on a settlement of the disagreements and signed a peace treaty after several rounds of negotiation.

In appearance, the signing of the treaty put an end to half a century of conflict between the two countries, and after years of being deprived of its rights in Arvandroud, Iran gained the sovereignty by determining the blue Talweg\(^7\) line of the waterway. In contrast, pleased with the obtained opportunity, the Iraqi government focused on their military and economic reconstruction and tried to redefine its position in the subsystem of the Persian Gulf by adopting a new approach in its foreign policies and proximity to the Western Bloc. Restoration of Iraq's power provoked the anxiety of the Shah of Iran, the superior power of the Persian Gulf and even the United States government. The army, which had been equipped with western weapons and weapons of the Orient, was able to become a powerful rival in the region by multi-year planning (Yekta, Former; 113).

Accordingly, the 1970s was coming to an end in such a condition that the two periphery powers in the subsystem of the Persian Gulf (Iran and Iraq) had begun a new round of

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\(^4\)These regions were economically, militarily and religiously important and strategically significant for controlling the world with a determining role in this regard. For instance, this region had a vast oil and gas reserves and highways for passing and is an important supplier of energy in the world.

\(^5\)Central Intelligence Agency

\(^6\)Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

\(^7\)A line that passes through the deepest part of the river.
confrontation. Although Iran continued to be the supreme authority of the United States under the full support of the United States, the other players of the international system (France and the Soviet Union) each represented a new role for Iraq in the framework of regional goals and their national interests; a role that became apparent to everyone in the 18th century, and thus, the Persian Gulf subsystem began a new phase of its life (ibid., p. 114).

After the collapse of Pahlavi government, Richard Nixon, the designer of the collective collaboration strategy, clearly described the coordination of Shah's policies, even if it was indirect: “The Shah filled the power vacuum, tried to secure the Strait of Hormuz by obtaining the triple islands, in Oman he crushed the Dhofar rebellion, by identifying Israel, he did not participate in the 1967 and 1973 Arab oil sanctions, he provided the required Mediterranean fleet oil, and by transferring forces and covert support for Kurds, he prevented Iraq from participating in the 1973 Arab-Israeli battle and supported South Vietnam (Nixon, 1985; 8-147). Shah was the key ally of the United States in the Middle East and the reason for stability in the geographical area from the Mediterranean to Afghanistan.” (Nixon; 1984, 409).

**Iranian Revolution, the International System and Iran-Iraq War**

Waltz, the theorist of the structural realism theory of international relations, believes that the structure of the international system, together with the type of its power distribution, is the main shaper of international politics and imposes itself on units. In fact, by distinguishing the causal relationships at the level of the structure from the existing causal relationships at the level of unit, Waltz expresses that the structure of the international system not only affects the level of government, but it also forms international relations through imposing restrictions on governments. As such, the distribution of power in the international system affects the ideological problems and performance of governments (Qavam, 2005; p. 85-90). Accordingly, the bipolar distribution of power in the Cold War, along with a strategic rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf, encouraged any conflict in this region, including the Iran-Iraq war, only to be affected by this balance of power (Little, 2007; p. 40).

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution and establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, slogan of ‘neither the East nor the West’, which was one of the main slogans of the revolution era, became a fixed principle in the foreign policies. In the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the principle of ‘neither the East nor the West’ was embodied as a guide to the practice of foreign relations. During the revolution, structure of the dominated international system was a bipolar military system, which was formed by the United States and Soviet Union as the two superpowers and poles of the system.

The emphasis of the Islamic Revolution on the slogan of ‘neither the East nor the West’, in addition to emphasizing on the independence of the country and representing a new way for revolution and national movements in the global arena, rationally placed the basis of the country's national security on national capacities and stressed the breaking of the bonds of dependence on world powers. The new discourse of the Islamic Revolution, which contained
the new order in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, was followed by the negative reaction of the bipolar system.

With its own characteristics, the bipolar system managed to dominate the entire world and divided countries into two major blocs. Although currents such as Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) were formed within the bipolar system, they never succeeded in becoming the third pole or even change or challenge the bipolar system. Moreover, the bipolar system managed to prevent the outbreak of World War III, while it unfairly transformed the war between the great powers to Proxy Forces Warfare by small countries. When the Islamic revolution challenged the bipolar system, it declared that this system denied the rights of nations and expressed that breaking the chains of US-Soviet colonialism was the only way to save nations.

With the slogan of ‘neither the East nor the West’, the Islamic Revolution was the founder of a new way, which at the same time, established the domination of two great powers on human affairs. Despite the great cost of this ideal, it maintained its independence and strategic slogan and succeeded in raising this strategic attitude as a genuine human revolution in the world, which expressed that the injustice in the bipolar system and domination of superpowers over the fate of humanity was the most important problem of the world at that time (Salehi, 2011; 139-140).

Accordingly, the negative balance policy that governed Iran’s foreign policy after the revolution caused the two blocs of power in the international system to conclude that Iraq was the first place where the Iranian revolution could be exported since in addition to being a neighbor of Iran and residency of the leader of the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini (1965-1987 in Najaf), Iraq had a considerable Shiite population and a number of important Iraqi Shiite clerics, including Ayatollah Hakim and Muhammad Baqir Sadr, lived in this country. Therefore, if Iran and Iraq were united as two oil-rich countries, they would have been able to ally with the other Persian Gulf countries as well. This would disrupt the balance of power in the Persian Gulf, as well as the distribution of power in the structure of the international system (distribution of power between the two poles), and the balance of cooperative power between the two poles would render the Iran-Iraq war a balancing factor (Salehi, Former; 142).

On the other hand, the United States and Soviet Union believed in the theory of war without winners to maintain balance and stability in the Persian Gulf region. Based on this joint political view, these two superpowers unanimously passed the 598 resolution in the Security Council of the United Nations on July 20, 1978 (Ramezani, 1981; 65). One of the most important results of the US-Soviet convergence in the second half of the 1980s was to force

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8 A belief that considers each of the two main blocs, namely the United States and Soviet Union, as superpowers. After the collapse of the Soviet Union (December 1991), many US scholars considered the US as the only superpower of the world.

9 It refers to a movement that was founded by a number of countries, which were not the members of the two main military pacts (NATO and Warsaw), and not even the regional military treaties (CENTO and SINO), who followed the politics of non-alignment or independent policy from the East and West Blocs (Ali Babaie, former; 219).

10 It refers to using military forces of a third party (usually under guardianship) in the battlefield instead of blue forces, whether by collusion or not.
Iran, a country that threatened the interests of both superpowers with its independence, to end the eight-year war with Iraq (Mohammadi, 1994: 11). In the Iran-Iraq war, which took place in an environment of bipolar power in the international system, the implicit cooperation of the two poles of power could be observed clearly.

In general, in the case of the Iran-Iraq war, the strategy of two superpowers in the region was to support Iraq and maintain the balance of the war (Ardestani, 1999: 93). These behaviors and reactions of the international system and superpowers toward the Iran-Iraq war showed the importance of creating balance by the superpowers in the regional wars.

**Status of Iraq as a Contributing Factor to the Security and Stability of the Persian Gulf in 1980s**

With the fall of the Shah of Iran, the military pillar of the security structure oriented toward the West collapsed, and the Persian Gulf region faced a vacuum of the advocates of power in the West. Furthermore, the balance of power was disrupted among the countries of the region and at the level of the two superpowers. On the other hand, based on the Waltz's theory, since the structure of the international system (peaceful bipolar) did not change as the most important factor in the shaping and determining of the foreign behavior of the states, Iran's foreign policy did not have to change necessarily despite the shift in the government. In other words, based on the logic of the bipolar system and Cold War, Iran had to continue to unite with one of two superpowers. The conditions of self-help\(^\text{11}\), which was created by the bipolar system, required the countries in a region like the Middle East to be located in one of the two blocs of East and West. Nonetheless, the Islamic Republic of Iran tried to maintain its independence and freedom in the international system by announcing the policy of ‘neither the East nor the West’ (Saniabadi, 2009; p. 61).

With the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty (February 10, 1979), the superior power and in fact the control mechanism of the Persian Gulf subsystem collapsed, and at the level of the countries of the region, the balance of power was in favor of Iraq, which was the other peripheral player of this system. Indeed, the Iraqi government's perception of the conditions was that with the collapse of the imperial system and regulating mechanism or the Persian Gulf security structure and dismantling of its army and key facilities, Iran was no longer able to play its role in the region. Therefore, Iraq was the only country to fill this gap and play a pivotal role in the security of the gulf; an action that had to be undertaken with planning, accuracy, speed and full consistency. Solution and strategy to achieve this goal and acquiring the role of the control mechanism in the region were designed as a comprehensive military attack on Iran by an effective stroke, which could lead to the defeat of this country (Yekta, Former; 114).

The main players in the international system, who feared the Islamic Revolution of Iran and considered it a threat to the southern Persian Gulf states and to the wider extent to the Middle East, consented that the Iraqi Ba'ath government act as a factor in balancing the region on their behalf to eliminate the risk for the countries of the region and secure the flow of oil by

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\(^{11}\)Considering the fact that governments are independent political units that primarily consider their survival and do not follow a central authority, under these conditions, self-reliance and self-help are imposed upon them in a form of compulsion (Qavam, former; 81).
containing the Islamic Revolution. Finally, all the conditions for the start of the Iraqi government's mission and inflaming the first Persian Gulf War were prepared (September 22, 1980), which was to end in six days by controlling the Islamic Revolution, and the Iraqi government was to become the new regulator of the regional relations (the superior power of the Persian Gulf and leader of the Arab world) (ibid. p. 115).

Although Iraq was able to engage Iran in a war for eight years and prevent Iran from playing an effective role in regional developments, Iraq became outcast and hated by the public opinion for committing war crimes against the Iranian military and civilian populations. Moreover, the regional countries that assumed that the Islamic Republic's threat was over not only no longer needed Iraq, but they also became suspicious of the regional goals of Iraq and started to consider its military power a threat to the stability and security of the region. In fact, at that time, the danger of Iraq replaced the anxiety about the Islamic Revolution, and its military capability disturbed the balance in the subsystem of the Persian Gulf; consequently, it required urgent control and inhibition. Iran successfully played the role of regional control mechanism, especially in the case of Iraq in 1970s, and now, it had no intentions to accept the role of controlling Iraq in favor of the countries of the region and to secure the flow of oil exports to the West.

On the other hand, the structure of the international system still considered the Islamic Republic of Iran a threat to its own interests. At the end of the 1980s, the strategy of dual containment\textsuperscript{12} of Iran and Iraq replaced the existing strategy of Iraq's containment. At that time, due to the lack of a regional control mechanism, the US, the intervener and influential player in the subsystem of the Persian Gulf, directly assumed the role of the control mechanism. This was while Iraq and Iran strongly opposed the establishment of a new order in the region and called for a regional role compatible to their national power and interests. Of course, the Iraqi Ba'ath government, unlike the Islamic Republic of Iran, relied on military power to achieve its desirable role and occupied Kuwait in a military strike on August 8, 1990 (ibid. p. 117-118).

Occupation of Kuwait by Iraq was the last strike to control the mechanism in the strategic region of the Persian Gulf, which had been seriously damaged by the end of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1978 and partially restored by Iraq, with its ineffectiveness proven during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war. However, the complete decline and fall of this mechanism took place when Iraq revolted against the unstable government and tried to redefine its position in the region by changing the structure and dividing power in the regional system.

On the other hand, the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council\textsuperscript{13}, Rapid Reaction Forces and Joint Defense Shield also tried to establish an internal control mechanism without requiring the two peripheral powers (Iran and Iraq), but they practically demonstrated that without the support of intervening transnational players, they did not have the ability to maintain the survival of the region's system and themselves. Thus, with the arrival of the great Western powers in the form of coalition for liberating Kuwait, the control mechanism that operated

\textsuperscript{12}This policy represented one of the strategies of the United States toward Iran and Iraq with the purpose of containing and ultimately isolating them (Ali Babaei, formerly: 567).

\textsuperscript{13}It consists of six countries in the southern region of the Persian Gulf: Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, and Saudi Arabia
indirectly during all the years following the 70s and appeared only in times of crisis and danger for the regional system, directly regulated the equations and relations of the Persian Gulf region (ibid. p. 119).

**The New International System and Control Mechanism in the Persian Gulf**

Behavior of the US toward the Kuwaiti crisis indicated that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was attempting to establish a new world order in the form of a global government without an economic border through playing the role of the international police. Of course, the world without an economic border means that multinational corporations\(^\text{14}\) can continuously and freely access the natural resources and global markets, and thus, realize the idea of "the world as a great store". In such a global system, the international police (US) would determine the responsibilities and limits of production in any region. Even Japan, Western Europe and other powers would carry out their duties in accordance with the US will (Elahi, 2006; 375).

Bush senior and his advisers, who were affiliated to the Rockefeller Faction in the Republican Party, continued to support the theory of military superiority and decisive role of the United States in the Persian Gulf, according to which the United States was in charge of applying policies to carry out guardianship by the trade and raw materials needed by the West to face rebellion, sectarian violence and regional adventure and instability. Controlling the Persian Gulf resources began a period of unprecedented power in history for the United States. Europeans, who supplied more than 20% of their oil from the Persian Gulf region as their fourth largest economic market, found that their most important economic rival, namely the United States, had direct control over the supply of oil and its major market. Of course, the United States could use this position to gain privilege from Europeans in different business areas, so that the United States could use its military strength in the Persian Gulf to dominate the global economy.

The end of the Cold War and Persian Gulf War (1991) gave Washington an opportunity to impose its superior position on Europe after the Cold War, preventing Europe from exiting the orbit of the United States. American peace supporters believe that in the Persian Gulf War (1991), the United States had finally overcome the cancerous tumor of Vietnam to play the role of the world police. In this system, (ibid, 362-363).

Considering these issues, it seems that in the Iran-Iraq war, the United States showed determination to continue to dominate the Persian Gulf region and avoid assigning and transferring its Middle East responsibilities to Europe. According to Paris and Ben, the Persian Gulf War was an opportunity for the Americans to make a comeback at the world and defeat Europeans, who had begun to fight the superiority of the United States. According to Le Monde, the purpose of Bush senior was to create a barrier between the Arab world and Europe, slow down the process of creating economic unity in Europe and implement the new world order plan to be ruled by Washington (ibid, 361).

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\(^{14}\)Companies whose headquarters were in one country and followed their activities through affiliated companies in other countries. Multinational companies which were also known as transnational corporations.
Conclusion

For many reasons, imperialist countries have focused on and struggled for the Persian Gulf region. Conflicts began since the 15th century in the form of imperialism and continued to dominate the region in the form of new imperialism after World War II (1945). Such domination always requires a balance of power in the region for survival and stability, and therefore, Britain acted as the balancing factor in the Persian Gulf until the early 70s.

Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf (1971), simultaneous with the prevalence of Détente conditions in the international system and maintaining the interests of superpowers in the strategic regions of the world without the presence of other superpowers resulted in applying the policy of climate partnership in the Persian Gulf, as one of the most strategic regions of the world. So, Iran and Saudi Arabia were chosen to undertake the role of controlling and stabilizing factor in the Persian Gulf.

The seemingly successful role of Iran as a stabilizing country changed with the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty (1979), and changes in the foreign policies under the cover of the ideological slogan of ‘neither the East, nor the West’, introduced Iran as a regional outlaws that needed to be controlled in the 1980s. Under such circumstances, another control mechanism had to be a factor for creating stability in the region to play the role of Iran in the 1980s. For various reasons, Iraq was the most suitable country to play this role in the Arab world's view, especially the two superpowers of the time. Therefore, the role was assigned to Iraq to be the containing factor for the Iranian revolution and create a balance of power in the Persian Gulf for almost a decade; however, Iraq could never appear as a security force in the region.

After the Persian Gulf War and with Iran's weakness, members of the central core of the Persian Gulf did not consider Iraq suitable for acting as a control mechanism. This was not desirable for the Arabian shield against the Iranian revolution. So this time, Iraq became the regional outlaw, and with the occupation of Kuwait and defeat by the US-led coalition, disrupted by the regional governments of the Persian Gulf since the 1970s, and the last structure of the control mechanism, which dominated the Persian Gulf since the 1970s by the countries of the region, completely collapsed. After that, another mechanism was created in the new conditions of the international system, known as the dual or simultaneous containment of Iran and Iraq, with the leadership and permanent presence of the United States in the region. The mechanism that considered itself a supporter of oil-rich Arab countries of the region caused the third Persian Gulf War (US-Iraq 2003) and fueled the arm race in the region by Iran phobia, which remains an ongoing issue.

Appendix

Age of Détente in International Relations

A) Pacifist Movement in France

By electing General Charles de Gaulle in the presidential election of 1958 as the president, a new era of political and military relations with the United States and Eastern Bloc were
established in this country. Understanding the new conditions of the world during the Cold War and growth of arms race between the East and West, the French president called for the expansion of comprehensive relations with the Eastern Europe and eliminating the factors that disturbed the fulfilling of this purpose. The emphasis on these foundations led to the development of peaceful and anti-war currents in France and Europe (Alwels, 1964; pp. 3-601).

**B) Policy toward the East of Western Germany**

With the victory of the Social Democratic Party in the elections of West Germany in October 1969, a new government was chaired by Willy Brandt as the Grand chancellor. Proposing the policy of looking toward the East, Brent began the new era of Détente and a pacifist movement. Brent believed that with the expansion of economic and cultural relations with the Eastern Bloc, the required background for Détente and maintaining the international peace would be provided (Brent, 1995; p. 96). Basis of the policy of looking into the East was to fight against militarism and violence in international relations.

c) **Moderation of Cold War between Superpowers, Disarmament Negotiations**

The years 1970-1976 marked the beginning of a new era of relations between the East and West, which was an important step toward the regulation of the Cold War. Nixon's visit in Moscow, as the first US president visiting Russia 55 years after the Russian revolution, was a result of this strategy, and it was agreed that the two countries avoid actions that might disturb this new situation (Crockatt, 1995; p. 224). The US Congress also reduced the defense costs and disagreed with costly arm plans.

**C) Britain East of Suez**

The remarks of Wilson, the Prime Minister of the British Labor Regime, on the necessity of rapid discharge of forces from the Far East and Persian Gulf until 1971 (Long, 1978; p.70) established the new strategy of Britain in Asia, known as the East of Suez, or the East policy of the Suez Canal. Basis of this strategy was the evacuation and retreat of the forces and some British bases from the east of the Suez Canal, which, according to the theorists of the state of London, included the Persian Gulf, Masirah Island in Oman, Singapore, Maldives Islands, Malaysia, Brunei and Hong Kong. By following this strategy, Britain's absolute rule over the Persian Gulf region was over after 120 years.

**E) Replacement Strategy, US Collective Participation**

Based on this new approach, which was heavily influenced by the consequences of the Vietnam War, evolution in Europe and relations between the East and West Bloc in the Age of Détente, the Western politics (especially the United States' politics) focused on the localization of the problems of the region given the difficulties of the presence of the US military in the Persian Gulf and due to the actions before the official withdrawal of Britain for controlling the situation in the region. To this end, the US policy was based on the
strengthening of the two main pillars, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia, in the region (Elahi, Former; 269).

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